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Abstract
In this article we attempt to identify the nancial characteristics of
takeover targets in UK using the period 1982-1990. The study analyses
the relationship between bidders and targets, and targets and non-targets
over two distinct sub-periods, 1982-1985 and 1986-1990 which are viewed
as being homogenous. The rst period followed a deep recession which
followed a distinct shift in Macroeconomic Policy after 1979. The second
period was associated with nancial liberalisation in 1986 and the freeing
up of Monetary policy that followed the Stock Market Crash in 1987. To
facilitate this analysis, two bi-variate Logit models are estimated over each
sub-period and over the period as a whole. The above models are used
to test whether Merger and Acquisition behaviour has changed by under-
taking a Likelihood Ratio based analogue of the Chow test. A General
Modelling strategy is adopted to select variables as a mechanism for pre-
cluding inconsistency and reducing the impact of collinearity. Comparison
is also made with a semi-parametric estimator.
Keywords: Bidders, General to Specic, Holdout Sample, Logit, Struc-
tural Change, Targets
1 Introduction
Following the seminal article of Singh (1971) we discriminate between bid-
ders/targets and targets/non-targets. Singh and more recently Cosh et al (1989)
have used the linear discriminant function to analyse Merger activity in the UK.
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Unfortunately, the linear probability model has some well known limitations
(Kmenta (1990)). Here, we follow the studies for the US by Harris et al(1982)
and Palepu(1986) as we use the logistic function to explain the choice event. It
should be noticed that this is not a tri-nomial problem as two distinct models
of behaviour arise. Firstly, we are interested in the decision of the rms to
pair o, the decision which makes a union between a particular targets and its
bidder so appropriate. Secondly a pure choice decision is made by the bidder
to select the target amongst the population of other rms. The use of a cross-
sectional method is justied by the selection of what might be viewed as two
fairly compact sub-periods, that is 1982-85 and 1986-1990.
In a recent study of Merger and Acquisition Behaviour, Dickerson (1997)
has used a panel to pool behaviour over a number of periods. Here, the idea
is to select sub-periods based on the economic environment rather than the
arbitrary cut-o associated with a calender separation of time and secondly to
test whether it is sensible to then pool the information associated with the two
sub-periods.
As a further check on the appropriateness of logit and given the diculty
with knowing the true functional relationship describing the chance event, the
results are compared with a semi-parametric estimator. Fairclough and Hunter
(1998) found that on the basis of predictability, a non-parametric estimator
generated by a neural net dominated the single layer net, which is a non-linear
least squares analogue of logit. In this article, comparison is made with the
semi-parametric, maximum score estimator. Firstly, the normalised logit para-
meters provided good starting values for the score estimator. Hence, the score
associated with the initial estimates can be compared with those associated with
the optimum for the score estimator. However, it is important to notice, that on
this criterion the score estimator will always dominate logit, because logit can
only hope to match the score estimator in the neighbourhood of a maximum.
The score estimator does not impose a functional form for the probability
density, as a result inference is a problem as standard information criteria may
not exist. Hence, the structure of any analogue likelihood function is not known,
which means that there is no knowledge of how the score estimator behaves in
a neighbourhood of the optimum. This has led to the bootstrap being used to
construct approximate standard error, but with no knowledge of an equivalent
likelihood such estimates may not be consistent. However, Lewbel (1998) has
suggested that bootstrap standard errors are acceptable for a wide class of
estimators when at least one regressor has massive support.
In this article, the maximum score estimator is used as a measure of the suc-
cess of the parametric alternative. Some inferential procedures are suggested
to check the specication of this estimator, based on a pseudo likelihood ratio
test. It is also of interest to note, that the score estimator is more robust to the
sample selected and it appears that the heterogeneity observed with the logit
estimates, in the case of targets and non-targets does not occur in the case of
the score estimator. The paper has three developments, the variable selection
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procedure, the tests for parameter constancy which discriminates between be-
haviour before and after 1986, and a new criterion for evaluating the maximum
score estimator.
The article proceeds as follows. In section 2, we summarise the key empirical
and theoretical literature. In section 3, we present the methodology adopted. In
section 4 we address the question of sampling and the data collection. Section 5
present empirical ndings based on logit and maximum score estimators for the
sample periods 1982-85 and 1986-90. The results distinguish between bidder and
target behaviour as compared with that of targets and non-targets.1. Section 6
oers conclusions.
2 Theoretical Developments
The role of merger and acquisition in economic and nancial theory is much
debated. Specically, is it a sign of market eciency or non-eciency; is it
a component of an optimal investment strategy or is it a sign of economic
ineciency both in the market for corporate control and in product markets via
concentration. The following section argues, that in the light of the nancial
regime, mergers and acquisitions by their nature occur in an environment in
which there are informational imperfections. It is suggested, that with the
bargaining framework associated with the bidding process, an analysis of market
based information is not appropriate. Finally, the literature provides a rich vein
of nancial theories from which such behaviour might be explained. It is argued,
that by being able to dene the motives for acquisition, then it is possible to
extract from the results conclusions which are consistent with one view of how
mergers are generated.
As with all economic and nancial research, the determinants of merger and
acquisition would appear to be an empirical question, in the sense that empirical
research has dened many of the theoretical developments. Hughes(1993) has
summarised much of the recent empirical research based on UK data.
In the nance and accounting literature, the topic of mergers and acquisitions
relates to the market for corporate control, Associated with this are a number
of hypotheses, which suggest that acquisition is linked with the avoidance of
bankruptcy, under valuation, high relative protability, unused debt capacity,
unused tax endowment and risk reduction or sharing. In addition there are
hypotheses directly related to increases in stock market ratios such as market
value per share, payout and P/E ratio. Clearly changes in these ratios can be
associated with many of the above theories.
Economic theory denes a number of motives for acquisition. Firstly acqui-
sition is linked to concentration and monopolisation of an industry. The cost
1
A non target rm is a rm which is neither a bidder nor a target rm for the period under
examination.
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of acquisition in economic terms relates to a loss in consumer surplus either via
a reduction in quantity or a reduction in product diversity. However, concen-
tration may also be related to dynamic benets associated with increased scale
economies, faster output growth and a more diversied product in the long-run.
Specically, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) note that diversication denes a barrier
to entry and that under monopolistic competition adverse market conditions are
likely to drive out products for which demand is inelastic. Hence, concentration
of an industry may have benets in terms of greater diversity and this might be
internal to the acquisition process. Often, the anticipated benets of acquisition
are much less tangible. The more traditional literature in economics talks of
market structure and discusses the benets in terms of acquiring distribution
networks or scarce resources via vertical integration or less tangible gains via
horizontal acquisition. This is suggestive of theories, which generate improved
eciency via synergetic benets to acquisition either nancial, operational or
managerial. Unfortunately, such eects may not be determined on an ex-ante
basis.
The market for corporate control is an important issue in the literature
for mergers and acquisitions. There is sucient empirical evidence (Manne
(1965), Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Singh (1992)) to suggest that takeovers
provide a control mechanism for disciplining managers, who run their rms in
ways that does not maximise prots or who are inecient. Before accepting
such arguments at face value, one must also account for the possibility that:
rstly managers may maximise dierent things to shareholders and secondly
in a stochastic environment in which endowments dier, that the rigors of the
market punish the weak.
Marris (1963) in his seminal work on Managerial Capitalism and Alchian
and Demsetz (1972) discussed the implications of institutional and informational
structure on managerial control. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) suggested that the
existence of a \ Monitor" is sucient to determine an appropriate institutional
structure to reward enterprise and penalise shirking. Monitoring justies the
role of the manager in economics, though this is complicated by joint production
and the question of who monitors the manager. The issue of control of the
monitor or managerial control was not a question addressed by Alchian and
Demsetz. However, as Marris (1963) suggests the issue may have little to do
with shirking as compared with the maximisation of dierent objectives. In this
light, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that managers optimise dierent
objective function and they suggest that both bonding and monitoring would not
of necessity result in the management optimising the objective function preferred
by the shareholders. Hence, the non-existence of an internal mechanism for
control is what gives rise to an external procedure, Merger and Acquisition.
If shareholders or the markets wish to maximise short-run prot while the
agent or manager wishes to maximise the value of the company, then what is
the appropriate criterion. Under Modigliani-Miller theorem (see Stiglitz and
Weiss(1981)), the principal should be indierent to income generated via cap-
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ital gain or dividends. However, with market imperfections, then agents may
not be indierent between the two forms of income as capital gains have to be
realisable at an appropriate point in time. Furtermore, the view that managers
act for their own benet and not in the interest of their shareholders has some
support in the literature (e.g., Trautwein (1990) and Seyhum (1990)). Any sug-
gestion that acquisition is aected by the nancial composition of the company
is indicative of market ineciency and failure of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem.
Much is made of the short-termism that operates in nancial markets. The
theoretical implication of this view is that it permits a wedge to exist between
the project evaluations of the market and those of the acquiring rm. If the
acquiring rm is maximising net present value over a longer horizon, then -
nancial markets evaluation of the acquisition are likely to be biased downwards,
because of incomplete insurance and the heavy discounting of the future by
the market. This suggests, the common nding of studies using market infor-
mation that negative or zero excess returns are often observed when acquiring
companies are analysed (Jarrel, Brickley and Netter(1988) and Scherer (1988)).
The wedge, in terms of discounting is a function of project managers being risk
neutral and highly optimistic about projected returns, while market analysts as
employed skeptics are likely to be risk averse.
As Giammarino and Heinkel (1986), suggest, the price revelation process
around an the time of an announcement is the result of a bargaining game,
which depends on the structure of ownership of the two companies. The rela-
tive strengths of the two boards is likely to determine the extent to which the
shareholders of the target company are able to bid away many of the poten-
tial gains associated with the new enterprise. This is especially likely when the
management of the bidding company are inclined to sanction any purchase to
the point at which they are indierent to the acquisition. A criterion for such
indierence might be the point at which the cost of acquisition equals the po-
tential benets less the potential loss of reputation should the bid fail. This
is the down side of the hubris eect rst discussed by Roll (1986). In conclu-
sion, acquisition does provide a means for controlling inecient management,
though the success of any bid is then dependent on the strength of purpose of
the management team doing the acquiring.
When one considers the studies based on company accounts, then measures
of value such as protability and price earnings ratios have often featured in
the analysis. However, the evidence is inconclusive: Hogarty (1970) and Singh
(1992) suggest that mergers have a neutral impact on protability while Kuehn
(1975) found that U.K. acquired rms had low protability.
Leverage or increased debt capacity is another often cited nancial reason for
acquisition (Vance (1969), and Shrieves and Pashley (1984)). Potential targets
may be characterised as having excess debt capacity, which means that the post-
merger rm can issue more debt. This suggests nancial synergy as neither the
acquired nor the acquiring rm may be in a position to utilise the extra debt
provision in a way which is optimal. Liquidity has been well documented in this
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literature, the above argument suggests that target rms are more liquid than
non-acquired rms (e.g., Simkowitz and Monroe (1971)).
As was mentioned above, many of the benets of acquisition relate to synergy
which is the result of component parts of an enterprise being more productive
in combination. According to Hunter and Wall(1989) synergy is self-evident in
conglomerate and horizontal mergers as it provides automatic entry by one of
the two enterprises into new product lines. As a result, there may very well be
external benets to acquisition which are likely to increase the level of the rm's
protability or indirectly improve eciency in some way. Managerial synergies
are realised when the bidding rm has better management team than the target
rm. However, it is often the case that hostile and non-hostile acquisition leads
to managerial wastage and often this has its own economies and dis-economies.
Managerial teams are often dominated by managerial hard headedness rather
than innate ability. Any synergies, that might arise are likely to come from the
acquisition of a strong group of middle managers who can continue the activities
of the acquired rm and strengthen the existing team. A more obvious benet
of acquisition, which may only be understood by the management team making
the bid is one of nancial synergy. Trautwein (1990) suggests that nancial
synergies are due either to the lowering of systematic risk, which is linked to the
nancial diversication associated with the newly dened investment portfolio
or by increases in rm size, which should give an enterprise access to cheaper
capital. Potentially these types of gains may be identied. For example, there is
evidence that a merger increases the market value per share of the rm (Baker
et al (1981)). And one nancial strategy used by acquiring rms is to boost
earnings per share (EPS) by acquiring rms with lower P/E ratios (Harris et al
(1982) and Wansley and Lane (1983)). This is because a high P/E ratio in the
acquired rm means that the acquiring rm is paying a high price for current
earnings.
In line with this idea of increasing the net present value of the enterprise, it
is possible that growth can be promoted by acquisition. Baker et. al.(1981) and
Hunter and Fairclough (1998) provide evidence in favour of growth as a motive
for Merger and Acquisition. Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) motivate their paper
by noting that the acquisition process relates directly to present value enhancing
activities. However, the theory is only addressed indirectly via the analysis of
nancial ratios.
Economies of scale are often viewed as a key motive for mergers along with
a desire for increased market power. Economies of scale can perhaps best be
realised with horizontal mergers. However, it is necessary to determine whether
a merger is horizontal, to be able to evaluate the potential for scale economies
and be able to determine the scale economies that might exist in an industry.
The construction of a model of the acquisition process is highly complex.
Any of the empirical procedure discussed, thus far can only be viewed as re-
duced forms. Models based on market information have assumed ecient mar-
kets and are often limited by the data sample used. Given, these limitations a
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decision has been made to use the accounting information. Such information is
consistent with the planning horizon required for an acquisition to be made and
indirectly addresses many of the theories discussed above. Managerial eciency
can be addressed via turnover and asset holding behaviour, issues of liquidity,
protability and growth via measures of such variables, market eciency via
variables, which measure nancial composition, while the present value compu-
tation is observed indirectly via the probability of acquisition relative to rms
not acquired.
Next, the methodology is selected, and inferential procedures and the sam-
pling methods discussed.
3 Methodology
The paper utilises logit to analyse the discrete choice problem. Logit provides
an approximation to most well known distribution functions while the procedure
is superior to the linear probability model on many counts. This includes the
linear discriminant function whose parameters are a linear transform of the
regression coecients (Maddala (1983)).
Thus far, much of the recent work on the UK follows from the classic article
by Singh (1971) who used the linear discriminant function and more recently this
work has been updated by Cosh et al (1989). Otherwise, there are a number of
articles looking at the US (e.g., Dietrich and Sorensen (1986) and Palepu (1986))
which have used Logit. To date there are only a small number of studies for the
UK that have used either logit or probit (see Dickerson (1997)).
In this article, care is taken to select a fairly homogenous time period, prior
to many of the big changes in UK nancial markets (de-regulation in 1986 and
the stock market crash in 1987). Given, the high degree of collinearity between
nancial ratios and the inconsistency associated with missing variables (Green
(1999)), a general modelling strategy dened for time series by Davidson et
al (1978) is used for variable selection. Whether the period before and after
1986 can be pooled is tested using a likelihood ratio test, which is the cross
section analogue of the test used in Hendry (1981). To control for the choice of
distribution function, comparison is made with results based on the maximum
score estimator due to Manski (1986).
Wansley and Lane (1983) cite the use of the discriminant function as a reason
for the insignicance of theoretically important variables such as liquidity and
protability. While, Simkowitz and Monroe (1971) emphasized that this was due
to a high degree of collinearity between nancial ratios. Bartley and Boardman
(1990) suggested a stepwise regression procedure for the exclusion of variables,
though here downward testing is preferred.
Logit moves us away from the linear probability model and unlike Probit it
does not impose the cumulative normal as the distribution function describing
the discrete event. However, all of the standard methods need to dene a
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probability model and this implies that the choice problem is dependent on a
vector of regressors or covariates. The regressors selected dene measures of
some of the hypotheses discussed above and the probability ( ) that a rm is
a takeover target can be described from the following function:
 = f (12:::5) (1)
where 1=protability, 2=inecient management (-), 3=nancial leverage (-
), 4 =corporate liquidity (+) and 5 = capital expenditure (+).
2 The latent
hypotheses behind the underlying theoretical model are described by 1; 2;
3; 4 and 5. In practice, these latent hypotheses are captured by a k variable
linear relationship x where x is k vector of nancial ratios, selected to represent
the latent hypotheses and  a k vector of parameters. For ease of comparison
with the existing literature, the model which transforms the linear relationship
into probabilities is dened by the logistic function:
f(x) =
ex
1 + ex
The logistic function denes a probability as f(x) 2 [0; 1]. The probability of
acquiring a target is given by:
prob(Of being Acquired) =
ex
1 + ex
The associated likelihood function is:
L =
Y
i2T
[
exi
1 + exi
]
Y
j2N
[
1
1 + exj
];
where T denes the number targets and N the number of non-active rms.
The above likelihood when maximised yields the following non-linear moment
condition:
@L(:j)
@
=
N+TX
i=1
x0i
r
"i = 0 (2)
where
r
"i = yi  ri, ri = exi
r
=(1+exi
r
 ), n = N+T is the number of observation
and
r
 is the maximum likelihood estimate of the parameters.
The logit estimator is compared with a maximum score estimator (Man-
ski(1986)), which does not involve the selection of a specic distribution func-
tion. This estimator maximises the scoring function which satises an optimal
2
In the parenthesis we have put the expected sign associated with each hypothesis.
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over-all prediction rule for a given cut-o quantile. The objective function to
be maximised is:
Maximise()S(N)() = (
1
n
)
nX
i=1
[yi   (1  2)]zi (3)
where yi takes the sign ( 1or +1) depending on the whether yi is either zero
or one. Therefore zi takes the sign ( 1 or 1) given the proximity of zi =
xb to zero or one. The cut-o implies zi <  is associated with a zero and
zi >  is associated with a 1. If  = :5, then (3) is considerably simplied as
yi   (1  2) = yi .
Subject to the choice of starting values, maximising (3) will improve the pre-
dictive performance of the model relative to logit or probit as such estimators
cannot dominate the score estimator. As non-linear estimators are sensitive to
starting values, normalised logit parameters are used to initialise the scoring
function. The score estimator (b) is maximised in a neighbourhood of the op-
timum when the smallest prediction error is disclosed. The procedure in Green
(1997) is used here and is maximised subject to the normalisation constraint

0
 = 1.
Unfortunately, the solution to the problem is not based on a likelihood cri-
terion so the information matrix is not known, which implies that it is dicult
to undertake inference. There is also some debate about the use of the boot-
strap to generate approximate standard errors (e.g., Kim and Pollard (1990)),
because such estimates may not be asymptotically consistent. In this article,
the bootstrap standard errors, implemented in Green (1997) are used. They are
based on the formula due to Efron (1979):
MSD = (
1
B
))
BX
i=1
[(di   b)(di   b)0 ];
Where B is the number of bootstrap replications, di the i
th bootstrap estimate
of  and b the Maximum Score estimator. Care needs to be taken in interpreting
the standard errors as there is no asymptotic results to fall back on. However,
Lewbel (1998) suggests that the bootstrap may be applied to a wide range of
semi-parametric estimators, as long as, the conditional distribution of the error
is independent of a co-variate with massive support.
A further question addressed, relates to the selection of the co-variates and
the statistical design. As was mentioned above, the problem with nancial
accounting data is the preponderance of measures of the theoretical variables
and the high degree of correlation between such measures. This also leads to a
problem of comparability with other studies as the measures used are somewhat
dierent. In an attempt to take account of this diculty, the general to specic
approach (Davidson et. al. (1978)) is used to test down to a specic model.
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Some thirty eight nancial ratios can be extracted from the literature, but of
these only thirty three can be used in the general model, due to the existence of
exact dependencies. The general to specic approach is particularly important
as in these types of problems the ommission of variables causes inconsistency
(Greene (1999)). Further, multicollinearity is a function of the latent structure
given by (1) as the covariates dene alternative measures of the same thing.
The standard test of specication is given by comparing the likelihood eval-
uated at the maximum against a model which only has a constant. Let:
y = X + "; where X = [ : X2] and  =

1
2

;
where X is an n k matrix of observations on the covariates,  is a unit vector,
X2 is an n  k   1 sub-matrix of X, 1 the intercept and 2 a k   1 vector of
non-constant parameters. The test of model t is associated with the following
null:
Ho : 2 = 0
Under the null the test is:
LRi =  2(log(LB)  log(LMi))  2(k   1) (4)
where log(LB) is the base likelihood associated with the model with a constant
and log(LMi) is the maximised likelihood for model i.
Now suppose a number of variables (g) are excluded, then X = [X1 : X2],
X1 is an n k   g sub-matrix of observations on the covariates included, X2 is
an n  g sub-matrix of variables to be excluded, 1 is k   g vector of included
parameters and now 2 is a g vector of excluded variables. The null is the same
as above, except that it relates to a model under the null with k   g variable.
The test is:
LRr =  2(log(Lr)  log(LGM ))  2(g):
Where log(Lr) is the maximised likelihood for the model that excludes X2 and
log(LGM ) is the maximised likelihood for the general model, which has all the
variables (X). The test can be written as the dierence in Likelihood ratio tests
for the two models. Therefore:
LRu r = LRGM   LRr  2(g) (5)
The above test is used to determine whether the restrictions imposed on the
general model are appropriate.
Given the fundamental changes that occurred in the UK economy in the
1980s and the change in the nancial and regulatory environment, then it ap-
pears highly unlikely that the same model will explain acquisition behaviour
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over the two periods. To dene a reasonably homogenous time frame we have
dierentiated between the period before the start of 1986 and a second sub-
sample that ends in 1990, when the economy was thrust into a deep recession
and merger and acquisition activity withered. To test the hypothesis, that the
two periods are the same we follow Barnes (1989) who rst suggested that it
might be relevant to test parametric stability over two sub-periods. In this ar-
ticle, an analogue of the Chow test is dened, which is based on same type of
likelihood ratio test used to test variable omission. The test compares a model
estimated over the full sample (1982-1990) with a more general model which
permits the parameters to change in the validation period (1986-1990). The
test is made operational by stacking the data for the nal model as follows:
X = [Xa : Xp] where Xa =

Xn1
Xn2

and Xp =

0
Xn2

:
where  =

1
2

: The models for two sub-samples n1 and n2 can be pooled
when:
Ho : 2 = 0
The test is a likelihood ratio test of the form:
LRpf = LRu   LRr  2(k) (6)
where LRu is the likelihood ratio test statistic for the model which combines
the two sub-samples and LRr is the likelihood ratio test statistic which pools
the two sub-samples. If the restriction, 2 = 0 holds, then the extra variables
are not required and the two sub-samples can be pooled.
When the maximum score estimator is considered, then testing is more com-
plicated as no likelihood function exists. In what follows a pseudo likelihood
ratio test is developed from the score. Given that, the normalised logit estimates
of  are used as starting values, then a direct comparison of models exists via the
score function based on the normalised logit parameters and that for the maxi-
mum score estimator b. The Score function is binary in nature which suggests
that the binomial approximation might hold for this statistic. To compare, the
performance of the score estimator with that for logit, then the null hypothesis
is:
Hro : S
 = So
where Sois the base score function associated with the initial values which max-
imise the logistic function.
The following test statistic is suggested:
S   Soq
21+
2
o 21o
n
 ! N(0; 1)
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where 2i = (1   Si)Si and 1o is the covariance. Consider the square of the
above test statistic:
LRs =
24 S   Soq
21+
2
o 21o
n
352 asy !21:
The above test might be viewed as a pseudo Likelihood Ratio test which com-
pares in an equivalent way parameterised score estimators.
If the score is estimated in a consistent way, then comparison can be made
for maximum score estimators over dierent periods and comparison of the
predictive performance of the models. This procedure is suggested by Fairclough
and Hunter (1998) in the context of their results based on a non- parametric
estimator derived from a neural network. The measure of t in this case is
viewed as performance relative to random selection. The null and alternative
hypotheses are given as:
Hro : S
 = 
Hr1 : S
 > 
where Si is the score function associated with the maximum for model i and  =
:5 is the cut o associated with randomness or the true population proportion.
Now look at the test of sample proportions:
Pri =
Si   q
(1 S
i
)S
i
N
Squaring the above test statistic yields the Pseudo Likelihood Ratio below:
LRri =
24 Si   q
(1 S
i
)S
i
N
352
It is well known, that the score statistic is not normal (Kim and Pollard,1990).
However, the appeal given to the binomial approximation presented above and
the observation in Fairclough and Hunter (1998), that score type estimators or
their standard errors quite quickly collapse to their asymptotic values would
suggest some form of normal approximation. It is conjectured, but not proven
that the following asymptotic result holds:
LRri =
24 Si   q
(1 S
i
)S
i
N
352 asy !2k
In the next sections, , the data are discussed and then are presented for mod-
els based on Bidders versus Targets and Non-Targets versus Targets. Likelihood
ratio tests of specication are also undertaken.
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4 Data and sample selection
In this section we briey discuss the population, data denitions and the sam-
ple. The data are dealt with in more detail in the data appendix. The data was
selected from a population which consists of a complete list of bidder and target
rms extracted from various editions of Acquisitions Monthly3 and the Finan-
cial Times Mergers and Acquisitions Journal4. A separate group of rms not
involved in Merger and Acquisition activity are dened as the rms not recorded
as bidders or targets during the period 1982-1990 in either of the above pub-
lications. The nancial information and accounts for the selected rms have
been taken from the Exstat database. The data employed in this study consists
of rms selected from the chemical, construction, food, electrical and electron-
ics engineering and mechanical engineering sectors. Initially a total number of
1,153 rms was selected of which there were 603 bidders, 314 target and 236 in
the non-target group. From the initial sample which denes a population for
the targets and bidders, the total number of rms falls to 427 companies. The
nal sample used for estimation is based on the following criteria: the existence
of a comprehensive set of nancial statements going back six years prior to the
announcement and held within the Exstat database. As a result the nal sample
includes 96 bidders, 161 targets and 170 non targets. For targets and bidders
the information set is dened for six years prior to the announcement date. For
the non targets, we collect relevant nancial statements for six years prior to the
target announcement year. The rationale for this is the a priori judgement that
given the size of the non-targets they are comparable with the targets rather
than the bidders. Further, the choice is made by the bidder between targets
and non-targets. Hence, one is not assumed to select to be a target as compared
with being a bidder, it is not a choice.
5 Empirical Findings
The models developed in the present paper are based on thirty eight nancial
ratios denoted X1 - X38 (see Appendix I) of which thirty one are available to
dene a general model. As was explained above, the ratios are broken down
into ve fundamental characteristics: protability, eciency, liquidity, leverage
and capital expenditure. The nancial ratios selected are chosen to analyse the
hypotheses discussed in section 2.
3The ` Acquisitions monthly ` gives information regarding the announcement date of the
take-over, the names, and
industrial classication of both bidder and target rms as well as the price of the bid.
4` Financial Times -Mergers and Acquisitions Journal' gives information regarding the
announcement date of the take-over, the names, and industrial classication of both bidder
and target rms as well as the price of the bid.
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In this section, we examine the nancial characteristics of target rms rel-
ative to bidder rms and target rms relative to non target rms. We present
results based on the binomial logit for the time periods 1982-1985 (estimation
period) and 1986-1990 (validation period). The estimates for the validation pe-
riod are primarily used to examine parameter stability which we subsequently
test using the method described in section 4. Variables are dropped using se-
quential likelihood ratio tests to test down from a model which includes thirty
three variables to more specic models with considerably fewer variables. The
procedure is in common use with time series econometric models (see David-
son et al(1978)). Furthermore, Hendry and Mizon (1978) consider the lack of
consistency which might arise when a specic to general approach is used. The
logit results are compared with those from the maximum score estimator.
The models presented here, encompasses those of Komis (1995) who used
step wise regression and Varimax Factor analysis to select models. We also
dene a couple of new variables one of which provides a new measure of short-
term assets. In undertaking any downward testing procedure one has to be aware
of the critique of Leamer(1978) who suggests that this process by denition
biases the t-statistic. However, with the severe risk of multi-collinearity with
this type of data and our indirect emphasis on t-values when specifying models
we believe that our implementation of the method is valid. Firstly, variables are
deleted on the basis of a weak t criterion of 25% and as a result the excluded
variables are highly insignicant. The nal decision to drop is then based on
a sequence of likelihood ratio test for which testing down in the Bidder Target
model only required ve steps. The nal step involved the re-denition of three
variables. It should also be noted, that the sequence of likelihood ratio tests are
independent.
In Table 1 we present the parameter estimates for the nal bidder-target
model estimated over the period 1982-1985. We have decided to accept as our
nal results those from the second column. This specication depends on six
variables of which Log(TA/S), (Q-WC)/S and (Q-WC)/TA are signicant on
the basis of the usual 5% criterion while the test for goodness of t is highly
signicant and the other two variables are very close to the 5% critical value.
Table1 goes here
It is of interest to notice, that while the parameters of the two models in table 1
are very similar, that the standard errors decline considerably with the exclusion
Q/S. As a result, we can readily accept the restriction that the coecients on
Q/S and WC/S have equal and opposite sign. The variable Q-WC might be
viewed as dening a new measure of short-run asset holding. It is not working
capital, but it is the form of short-term nance which can be readily mobilised
to fund the acquisition.
To summarise, when log(S/TA) is high then relative to the bidders you are
at risk of being acquired. This is a measure of sales volume which was viewed
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by Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) and Hunter and Fairclough (1998) to have a
positive coecient. Relatively high sales volume reduces the cost of acquisition.
The new measure of short-assets (Q-WC) is measured relative to sales and to
total assets. On this basis it is hoped to distinguish two types of eect. Firstly,
a liquidity eect as rms with substantial liquid asset holdings are likely to be
attractive to bidders as this reduces the risk of acquisition and secondly a mea-
sure of nancial weakness as potentially bankrupt or highly geared companies
are likely to have low levels of liquid assets. If liquidity is viewed relative to
sales, then this denes a real measure of the liquid asset position of the com-
pany or a real measure of the resources which might be mobilised to pay for
the acquisition. From the perspective of the bidding company this purchase is
attractive when the acquired company has high liquid assets relative to sales.
However, when one considers the same numerator relative to total assets,
then the total asset holding of the bidder is likely to be a predominant feature
of this ratio. A company with a relatively large easy to mobilise holding of
liquid assets relative to total assets, will be able to use such assets to defend
itself prior to any acquisition. Companies with liquidity low relative to total
assets are not nancially secure, because they need to renegotiate a substantial
amount of short-term nance. There are two possible reasons for this, rstly
they may be at risk of bankruptcy or secondly they may be highly geared with
most of the funding coming from short-term nance. In either circumstance, the
company is ill-prepared to defend itself from a takeover and is likely to benet
from some form of nancial restructuring. This result implies that the sample
of acquiring companies is nancially more secure than the targets.
The log of sales is often used as a measure of company size. Companies
which are targets have relatively lower sales than the sample of bidders. Hence,
they are less likely to be able to fend o an acquisition. When discriminating
between bidders and targets it appears that the targets are all relatively weak
either in nancial or in physical terms. Otherwise, the bidder nds it easy to
mobilise short-term benets associated with the acquisition. Suggesting that
bidders select rms which are either easy to acquire, because they are weak or
the cost of acquisition is low. This would suggest that UK acquisitions when
the population of listed and unlisted rms are considered have been speculative
or opportunist in nature.
When the performance of the logit estimator is considered, then jointly the
parameters in the model are signicant as 2(5)= 30.52 exceeds the critical
value (2:05(5)=11.1). When the test associated with the general is considered,
then:
LRu r = LRGM   LRM1 = 48:46  30:52 = 17:9362  2(26)
When the test is compared with the critical values in the tables, then exclud-
ing twenty six variables is readily accepted at both the 5 and the 1% levels
((2:01(26)=45.6). If one takes the test as one of three model selection criterion,
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then an approximate joint condence interval is based on the Bonferroni princi-
ple. That is selecting i =1.67 as the level of each individual test when i = 3 and
then the joint rejection region is approximately 5%. If the test of predictive
failure is undertaken, then:
LRpf = 15:012  2(6)
This is not signicant at the 1% level (2:01(6)=16.8). If a once and for all
adjustment is allowed for, via a shift in the constant, then the test is also
accepted at 5% level as 2(5)=10.225 is less than 2:05(5)=11.1. It would appear,
that appart from a shift in the constant, the model accepts the notion that it
is possible to pool the bidder-target behaviour across the 80s.
If the maximum score estimator is looked at, then the signs of coecients are
the same for all variables except QTA , which isn't signicant which ever estimator
is chosen. The score estimator dominates logit when the predictive performance
is considered. If the t is considered, then the Score estimator based on the
pseudo Likelihood ratio when compared with the least favourable critical value
is as signicant as logit (the test statistics are very similar). When the score
is compared with the logit measure for predictive performance, then the Score
would not appear to be signicantly better as the test, which is approximately
2(1)=3.7846 is less than the critical value (2:05(1)=3.84).
The maximum score estimator, for the period 1986-90 performs especially
well with the best t of all models. Its performance is signicantly dierent from
randomness when the test is compared with any of the conventional criterion.
Again the explanation of all of the above models is conherent and in terms of
specication the model estimated over the period 1982-85 cannot be rejected by
the data.
Next we consider the decision to select a target against a family of non-
acquired rms where the sample is paired by comparison with similar sized
companies in the industry, but not involved in acquisition activity. The results
of the model in Table 2 for the period (1982-1985) indicate that the key de-
terminants for selecting the target are the log of equity plus capital reserves
relative to total assets (log((E+K)/TA)) that is used in the literature as a mea-
sure of Turnover. As such, the sign is ambiguous (Dietrich and Sorensen, 1984),
because it relates both to an eciency and a growth argument. Loan capital
plus preference capital relative to total assets ((LC+PC/TA) measures leverage.
Variables signicant at the 5% level are cash position no.3 (Cash) which is a
measure of liquidity and number of debtor days (D-days), a
Table2 goes here
measure of risk of failure and cash to total assets (Cash/TA) another liquidity
measure.
If we refer to previous studies, then we can see that the ratios in our specied
model (See Table 2) have appeared in previous studies of both the UK and the
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US. The natural log of total assets ratio was employed by Harris et. al.(1982) as
a proxy for size. Here it combines with what might also be viewed as a measure
of eciency, which would suggest that target rms are relatively inecient. This
nding is also consistent with the results for bidders and targets.
Loan capital and preference capital to total assets was rst used by Stevens
(1973) as a proxy for leverage. He found that acquired rms have a lower Long-
Term Liability/ Total Assets ratio, which is quite consistent with our nding of a
negative coecient. Similar results where also discovered by Harris et al.(1982),
Wansley and Lane (1983) and Dietrich and Sorensen (1984). This implies that
the targets have relatively low levels of leverage so they use less debt in their
capital structure. If capital markets were perfect, then the proportion of debt
to equity should not aect the ownership structure. Howerver, Firms with more
debt appear more dicult to acquire.
Cash to total assets was rst used by Belkaoui (1978) as a measure of liq-
uidity. As was suggested in Table 1, targets are illiquid relative to all rm when
cash holding relative to total assets is considered. This is a further indication,
that these companies are nancially weak when compared with other rms in
the industry. A similar indication follows from the debtor days variable, which
implies that the company is having diculties receiving its debt repayments.
Otherwise companies which grow too fast or become too highly geared some-
time run into such diculties. Again this is a sign of weakness which is likely
to indicate a weak nancial position and/or management which is inecient.
Equity and capital reserves was employed by Simkowitz and Monroe (1971)
who suggested that it was a proxy for growth. This variable according to
Simkowitz and Monroe indicates that acquired rms were unable to build the
equity base needed and this was a signal of low growth potential. However,
Hasbrouk (1985) suggested that this ratio was better viewed as a measure of
size. Both of these hypotheses are quite consistent with the target being rela-
tively weak when compared with other rms in the industry. However, when
this variable is in a model already employing total assets as a measure of size,
then it appears more likely to measure turnover. According to Dietrich and
Sorensen, when the sign is positive then the variable is linked to growth, which
is consistent with the results in Fairclough and Hunter (1998).
Cash position (no.3) was used by Clayton and Fields (1991) as a proxy for
liquidity, but did not appear in their nal model. The present paper suggests
that target rms have high cash reserves, this means that even should the com-
pany be highly inecient or unprotable their are assets, which can be used
to cover a high proportion of the cost of the acquisition. This is consistent
with the liquidity argument made above when the Target is viewed relative to
Non-Targets. However this result changes when the maximum score estimator
is considered.
In general the results for the model for the period 1986-1990 are remark-
ably consistent with the above results as most of the coecients lie within two
standard errors of each other. Certainly all of the signs are the same, though
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the coecient on loan capital plus preference capital relative to total assets, a
measure of Leverage is substantially smaller in the second period.
When the performance of the logit estimator is considered, then jointly the
parametersin the model are signicant as 2(6) = 34:05 exceeds the critical
value (2:05(6) = 12:6). When the test associated with the general model is
considered, then:
LRu r = LRGM   LRM1 = 66:38  34:05 = 32:33  2(25)
If the test is compared with the critical values in the tables, then exclud-
ing twenty six variables is readily accepted at both the 5 and the 1% levels
((2:05(25) = 37:7). If the test of predictive failure is undertaken, then:
LRpf = 18:9  2(7)
This is marginally rejected at the 1% level (2:01(7) = 18:5). A once and for
all adjustment in the intercept seems less relevant here as it appears to be the
coecient on the gearing variable which is dierent (LC+PCTA ). Hence, it would
appear that it is not possible to pool bidder compared with non{active behaviour
across the 80s.
If the maximum score estimator is looked at, then the signs of coecients
are the same in the case of the signicant variables except for the cash position
which is the most important variable. The improvement in this model seems
to follow from the behaviour of cash position, which appears to operate as a
defence against acquisition or rather a reason not to be selected. If the t
is considered, then the pseudo Likelihood ratio for the score estimator when
compared with the least favourable critical value is more signicant, than in the
logit case. As might be anticipated this model ts the best over the two regimes.
It is also highly consistent in terms of parameters. If a comparison is made of
the t over the two period, then the test is not signicant. The maximum
score estimator, for the period 1982-85 performs especially well with the best
t of all models. Its performance is signicantly dierent from randomness
when the test compared with whatever chi-squared criterion might be viewed
as acceptable. Furthermore, this estimator would appear to generate models,
which are indistinguishable across the two periods.
5.1 Conclusion
This article has analysed the behaviour of bidders and targets over the esti-
mation period 1982-1985. This model was a special case of a more general
specication and subject to the acceptance of a test at the 1% level or that the
two periods are only dierent by a xed factor then the results do not sugest
substantially dierent behaviour over the two sub-periods.
When the best estimator for the second sample is considered, then the stabil-
ity of the relationship for the behaviour of targets relative to non-targets is even
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more impressive as the two relationships estimated over dierent periods are
very similar. Usually the key determinant of a well specied model is the ability
to predict in a substantially dierent period. This is clearly accepted when the
maximum score explanation of targets relative to non-targets is considered.
When bidders and targets are compared, then the key factors which appear
to discriminate between the two categories of rm is that targets are nancially
weaker and smaller than their bidders. Relatively high sales volume and high
liquidity to sales also discriminates targets from bidders. Relatively high sales
and liquidity make the rm attractive as they suggest that the rm has the
cash through put to cover some of the costs of acquisition. These results are
also reected, though with slightly dierent ratios in the results for the targets
relative to non-targets.
Non-targets are also viewed as being nancially weak when debtor days and
liquidity as measured by cash ow is considered. They are also have growth
potential when turnover is looked at and spare debt capacity on the basis of the
leverage position. Hence, the acquired rm relative to the non-acquired has less
debt, more cash and growth potential, but is nancially weak in terms of cash
to assets and debt position in terms of debtor days. The above results would
also appear to be consistent with nancial theory and provide an acceptable
theoretical explanation.
It also appears to be the case that the diagnostic tests have helped in the
selection of the best models. Specically, logit and maximum score appear to
be indistinguishable for the bidders and targets data, but the maximum score
estimator appears to be preferred in the case of targets versus non-targets. This
leads to models that are consistent across the two sub-periods.
6 Data Appendix
The bidder is dened as a rm that has announced an attempt to takeover
another rm. We have dened the year this oer is announced as the \ an-
nouncement year" .A target is dened as a rm that has received a bid by
another rm. We have dened the year this oer is received as the \ announce-
ment year" .A non target is dened as a rm that has neither received a bid
by another rm nor has attempted to takeover another rm but the year of
announcement for that group is the year a target rm received the bid. The
following key variables entered the nal specications are dened as variables:
Protability Group:
X1 = Return on Capital Employed = (Prot before tax/ Total Assets) 100
X2 = Prot to Sales = (Prot after tax/Sales) 100
X3 = Prot to Total Assets = (Prot after tax/ Total Assets) 100
X4 = EBIT to Sales = (Prot before tax/ Sales) X 100
Eciency Group:
X5 = Sales to Shareholders' Funds = (Sales/ Shareholders' Funds)
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X6 = Sales to Total Assets = (Sales/ Total Assets)
X7 = Annual Sales = Natural Log of Sales
X8 = Sales to Fixed Assets = (Sales/ Total Net Tangible Assets)
( Net Tangible Assets exclude leased assets and those under construction).
X9 = Sales to Current Assets = (Sales/ Total Current Assets)
X10 = Annual Equity and Capital Reserves = Natural Log of Equity and
Capital
Reserves.
X11 = Annual amount of Total Assets = Natural Log of Total Assets
X12 = Average Debtor Collection Period = (Debtors/ Sales) 365
X13 = Debtors Turnover = (Sales/ Debtors)
X14 = Current Ratio or Working Capital Ratio = (Total Current Assets/
Total
Current
Liabilities)
X15 = Acid Test or Liquid Asset or Quick Asset Ratio
= (Total Current Assets-Stock of Finished Goods)/ Total Current Liabilities
X16 = Asset Cover = (Total Assets/ (Total Liabilities-Total Current Liabil-
ities)
X17 = Cash Position No1 = [(Cash & Equivalent + Interest Received)/ Total
Current
Liabilities] 100
X18 = Cash Position No2 = [(Cash & Equivalent + Interest Received)/
Sales] 100
X19 = Cash Position No3 = [(Cash & Equivalent + Interest Received)/ Total
Assets]
100
X20 = Working Capital to Sales = (Total Current Assets - Total Current
Liabilities)/
Sales
X21 = Working Capital to Total Assets = (Total Current Assets - Total
Current
Liabilities)/ Total Assets
X22 = Cash to Total Assets = (Cash & Equivalent/ Total Assets)
X23 = Cash to Current Liabilities = (Cash & Equivalent / Total Current
Liabilities)
X24 = Quick Assets to Total Assets = (Total Current Assets-Stock of Fin-
ished
Goods/
Total Assets)
X25 = Quick Assets to Sales = (Total Current Assets-Stock of Finished
Goods/
Sales)
X28 = Current Assets to Total Assets = (Total Current Assets/ Total Assets)
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X29 = Current Assets to Sales = (Total Current Assets/ Sales)
Leverage Group:
X26 = Long Term Liabilities to Shareholders' Equity = (Total Liabilities-
Total Current
Liabilities)/ Shareholders' Funds
X27 = Total Liabilities to Shareholders' Equity = (Total Liabilities/ Share-
holders'
Funds)
X30 = Preference and Loan Capital to Equity and Reserves=
= [Preference Capital + (Total Liabilities-Total Current Liabilities)/ Share-
holders'
Funds]
X31 = Loan Capital and Preference Capital to Total Assets=
= [(Total Liabilities-Total Current Liabilities)+Preference Capital / Total
Assets]
X32 = Interest Paid to Loan Capital
= [(Total Interest/ (Total Liabilities-Total Current Liabilities)]
X33= Total Prot to Interest Paid = (Prot after tax/ Total Interest)
X34 = Gearing Ratio
= [(Total Liabilities+Preference Capital)/(Shareholders' Funds+Minority
Interest+Total Liabilities)]
X35 =Debt to Equity Ratio= [(Total Liabilities+Preference Capital)/(Shareholders'
Funds+Minority Interest]
X36 = Interest Cover = (Prot before Interest & Tax/ Total Interest)
Capital Expenditure Group:
X37 = Capital Expenditure to Total Assets = Capital Expenditure Con-
tracted/ Total
Assets
X38 = Capital Expenditure to Sales = Capital Expenditure Contracted/
Total Sales
New Ratios:
X40 = X11-X7= log (TA/S)
X41 = X20-X25= (WC-Q)/ S
X42 = X21-X24= (WC-Q)/ TA.
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Table 1 Bidder vs Target rms, 1982-85 and 1986-90
Variable 1982-85 1982-85(semi-par) 1986-90 1986-90(semi-par)
Constant 0.72072 (2.608) .15516(.24008) 3.7306(2.029) .2909 (.14281)
log( STA ) 9.4214 (4.289)* .51531(.25134) 2.4784(1.448) .14859 (.15072)
(Q WC)
S 20.915(8.102)** .79906(.29999) 7.8739 (2.285) ** .82304(.0841)
(Q WC)
TA -11.462(5.518)** -.26167(.29813) -2.5343(2.029) .43086 (.19188)
log(S) -0.58038(0.3164) -.44663 (.03188) -0.48293(0.2517) -.02582 (.02619)
Q
TA -3.0038 (3.948) .03246 (.21769) -0.55539(1.223) -.16628 (.1459)
Q
S -0.011203 (4.828) -.01893 (.23283) 1.9396(0.6759)** .04396 (.15623)
Score .50515 .74227 .75714 .80714
Log-L -51.96824 -75.1168
Base Log-L -67.23012 .5 -89.34125 .5
2(5) 30.52376** 28.449 **
2(31)G-M5 48.46** 75.4077
2(26)6 17.9362 46.99**
2(6) 15.012*
10.225
Count R2 68.7643 74.23% 76.60% 80%
Where Q=Quik Assets, S=sales TA=Total assets and WC = Working Cap-
ital. (* signicant at the 5% level and ** signicant at the 1% level)
5The Chi-squared goodness of t statistic for the General Model which includes 31 ratios.
6Likelihood ratio test for the restricted model for which P2(25) = P2(31) - P2(6).
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Table 2 Non-Active vs Target rms, 1982-85 and 1986-90
Variable 1982-85 1982-85(semi-p) 1986-90 1986-90(semi-p)
Constant 0.63922 (2.490) .01154 (.00779) -2.7225(1.790) .0121 (.01478)
Log(E+CRTA ) 7.5526*(2.822) .13707* (.0059) 3.0137** (1.137) .13516 (.01304)
Log(TA) .78714* (0.3448) .01436* (.00364) .34451* (.2188) .00918(.01293)
D-days 0.011791** (0.008089) .00018 (.00033) 0.023128****(0.006052) .00032(.00098)
LC+PC/TA -7.3222**** (2.508) .00794 (.00523) -0.90835**** (0.3835) .01657(.00957)
Cash 0.47118*** (0.2658) -.9816* (.00054) 0.42626***(0.1198)* -.98262(.05737)
Cash/TA -54.732*** (29.53) -.13146*(.00419) -41.630***(12.70)* -.12527(.01345)
Score .71963 .76636 .55556 .74242
Log-L -56.7623 -113.6270
2(6) 34.05 108 44.78276
2(30)G-M7 66.38 56.99(15)
2(25)8 32.33 12.12(9
2(7)9 18.9 (NA)
Count R2 71.96% 76.636% 68.69% 74.242%
Signicant at the 95%(**) and 99% (*) level and (standard error). LC denes
Loan Capital, PC is Preference Capital, E annual equity, D-days debtor
collection period, CR, Capital Reserves.
7The Chi-squared goodness of t statistic for the General Model which includes 31 ratios.
8Likelihood ratio test for the restricted model for which P2(25) = P2(31) - P2(6).
9Likelihood ratio test for parameter constancy relative to the holdout is P2(7) = P2(14) -
P2(7)..
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